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S U M M A R Y
This paper analyzes the impact of the sale of rental housing in Amsterdam on the local housing market. This
increases the supply of owner-occupied housing, but can also contribute to gentrification associated with the
inflow of different household groups. Earlier literature focused on the former effect and reported a negative price
effect. We take a fresh look at the issue by considering the sale of private as well as social rental housing, allow
for differing time trends within the municipality, controlling for area fixed effects, distinguishing between short
and long-term impacts and addressing endogeneity of the sale of rental housing. The main finding is a robust
gentrifying effect of the sale of private rental housing in the core area of Amsterdam.
1. Introduction
Housing markets differ widely among countries. The Netherlands is
unique for its large share of social housing and the associated system of
rent control that covers the large majority of rental housing. The system
links the maximum allowed rent to the quality of the house as indicated
by its structural characteristics such as floor space or number of rooms
but for a long time did not take into account location at all. Although
recent measures have allowed a limited impact of this variable, social
housing still has essentially the same rent, conditional on structural
characteristics, everywhere in the country.
The prices of Dutch owner-occupied houses are determined by
market forces, and are considerably higher1 in the densely populated
western part of the country, particularly so in the larger cities making
social housing especially attractive in those places. Considerable excess
demand is the obvious consequence.
Due to the rent control, construction of rental housing of modest
quality was unprofitable in the Netherlands under market conditions.
Between 1945 and 1990 the government therefore subsidized its con-
struction. The subsidy covered the gap between the present value of the
net revenues and construction costs. The national government set an-
nual targets for housing construction and was actively involved in
realizing them. Social rental housing in the Netherlands is owned by
housing associations. These are non-profit organizations most of them
originating from the 19-th and early 20-th century to promote the
construction of social housing for their members through savings, loans
and subsidies.2 Housing policy after World War II (WWII) allowed them
to realize their goals and to become owners of a large share of the Dutch
housing stock.
In the two largest Dutch cities, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, social
democrats were the dominant political party throughout the 20th
century and they focused attention on the construction of social
housing. 70% or more of the new housing in these cities was of the
social rental type. A large fraction of the older rental housing stock in
these large cities was private property. Most of it was also covered by
rent control since the beginning of World War II.
By the end of the 1980 s, it became clear that the need for more
social housing was limited. Many Dutch households preferred owner-
occupation and were able to pay for it. The existing stock of low quality
rent controlled housing was sufficient for the lower income households
that, presumably, were in need of assistance for housing. Moreover, it
became apparent that the housing associations, who owned the social
rental housing that had been constructed with the help of subsidies, had
been able to accumulate a significant amount of equity, due to what in
hindsight seemed a conservative estimate of the net revenues associated
with such housing. It was therefore decided to abandon the generic
subsidies for the construction of social housing, and provide more op-
portunities for owner-occupied housing in the national housing con-
struction programs.
This turning of the tide occurred when it also became clear that the
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departure of high-income households out of the large cities, to ‘growth
centers’ and rural municipalities where owner-occupied housing was
available and relatively cheap had devastating consequences for the big
cities. The new spatial planning policy focused on housing construction
close to the existing large cities (the so-called Vinex areas) and there
around 70% of the new houses became owner-occupied. On top of this,
the government realized an active urban renewal program that in-
creased the average quality of housing and amenities in the big cities.
The new housing policy was successful. The market for owner-oc-
cupied housing started an extended boom period that continued until
2007. The sale of social housing to private households was made pos-
sible on a limited scale. Moreover, the increasing house prices stimu-
lated the sale of older, privately owned, rent-controlled housing. The
resulting decrease in the share of rental housing in the older parts of the
big cities played an important role in the Dutch variant of ‘gentrifica-
tion.’ This term refers to the inflow of young and often well-educated
households to inner-city neighborhoods that used to be inhabited by
older and low income households.
The return of interest in urban living among high-educated young
workers is a worldwide phenomenon that has been referred to as ‘the
great inversion’ by Ehrenhalt (2013). Early signs of this phenomenon in
European cities were reported in Cheshire (1995). A decade later it was
clear that resurgent cities were a robust worldwide phenomenon, al-
though much of the evidence still originated from Europe, see for in-
stance the special issue of Urban Studies introduced by Cheshire (2006).
Baum-Snow and Hartley (2016) and Couture and Handbury (2016)
have recently provided extensive documentation of it for U.S. cities. An
interesting and important aspect of the popularity of central city
neighborhoods among such households is the impact their presence has
on the attractiveness of these neighborhoods. That is, high income
households flow into older neighborhoods because they like them, but
by doing so they change their demographic composition. This may
further reinforce the attractiveness of the neighborhood. The phenom-
enon may simply work because of the fact that households like to in-
teract with other households that are similar, a phenomenon referred to
by sociologists as homophily: “similarity breeds connection”, see
Mcpherson et al. (2001). For instance, Bayer et al. (2007) provide a
striking illustration of the importance of this self-segregating force for
household location decisions. Alternatively, the presence of more high
income households may have a positive impact on neighborhood
amenities like the outward appearance of houses, the presence of shops,
cafés and restaurants, et cetera.
Gentrification is likely to have consequences for house prices in the
neighborhoods concerned as the incoming households have to overbid
others interested in living in these areas. Indeed, Guerrieri et al. (2013)
document the close relationship between gentrification and house price
growth. The price effect consists of two components: the newcomers
overbid the existing households and after they have settled, the
neighborhood may become more attractive due to their presence, which
provides an additional increase in demand and, hence, a further in-
crease in house prices.
The emergence of interest in a particular neighborhood by high
income households that formerly lived elsewhere implies an increase in
local demand for housing, which tends to drive up prices. The presence
of good substitute housing elsewhere in the city for the original in-
habitants may mitigate its impact on actual price change.3 The ‘social
interaction’ effect, that comes on top of it, works through the changing
demographic composition of the neighborhood. In general, the two
effects are hard to disentangle without an elaborate model of residential
sorting that allows for the study of residential mobility and the role of
neighborhood demographics. For instance, Guerrieri et al. (2013) are
unable to distinguish the two components.
Autor et al. (2014) recently studied the impact of the end of rent
control in Cambridge (Massachusetts) and found a large impact on local
house prices. Interestingly, they found that the value of houses that had
never been rent-controlled also increased after its ending. This suggests
that the neighborhoods became more attractive after new residents –
paying the higher, no longer controlled, rents - had moved in. The si-
milarity with the situation in the Netherlands is noteworthy: the for-
merly rent-controlled housing in Cambridge increased the supply of
housing for high income households since the low income households
who couldn't afford the higher rents moved out. However, the change in
the demographic composition of the inhabitants apparently had a po-
sitive impact on neighborhood quality.
In this paper we consider the impact of the sale of rent-controlled
housing in Amsterdam. This can be interpreted as the end of rent-
control for part of the housing stock. It seems reasonable to expect that
in this city the same forces are at work as in Cambridge (Ma). However,
their relative importance is not necessarily the same. We noticed al-
ready that throughout the Netherlands and in particular in big cities
like Amsterdam, the share of rent-controlled housing in the total stock
was very large – it was in fact the majority. It seems likely therefore that
the average inhabitant of this type of housing was closer to the average
Dutch household than the average inhabitant of rent controlled housing
in Massachusetts was to the average Boston metro area household.
Moreover, tenants could obtain the social houses that were for sale at a
discount. This suggests that the change in demographic composition
following the sale of social housing in Amsterdam could be less sig-
nificant than that studied by Autor et al. (2014) and that their findings
were determined partly by the local conditions of their study area.
The paper unfolds as follows. In the next section we provide more
information about the Amsterdam housing market in the past three
decades. Section 3 provides further information about the data.
Section 4 presents the econometric analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Amsterdam housing market and the data
2.1. Introduction
The city of Amsterdam is located in the western part of the
Netherlands. Its name refers to a dam on the Amstel river constructed in
the middle ages, and the Dam square is in fact still the center of the city.
Amsterdam experienced a ‘golden age’ in the 17th century and many
buildings in the area referred to as the center in the map in Fig. 1 still
date back to that period. The other areas indicated on that map (in
Dutch known as ‘Stadsdelen’) were built up in later times. The ring
immediately surrounding the center, the areas North, East, South and
West, largely in the 19th and early 20th century and New West and
Southeast after WW II.
The housing stock in Amsterdam reflects history. The canal belt is
world-famous and most of its houses, many of them constructed by rich
merchants, are owner-occupied. In the 19-th century extensions of the
city private rental housing was dominant except in the South where
higher income people located close to the Rijksmuseum and the concert
hall. In the course of the 20th century social rental housing, owned by
housing associations, became dominant, especially in the period
1950–1990. Since then owner-occupied housing has become more im-
portant in new construction.
Like for so many other cities, the 1970 s and 1980 s were a difficult
time for Amsterdam. Many younger and high income households pre-
ferred owner-occupied housing and suburban living environments.4
This left the city to older and low-income households and students.
However, the revival of interest in urban living in more recent
decades caused a remarkable revival of the city, which was helped by
3 Compare, for instance, the discussion in Bayer et al.(2007) on the impact of
preference for the presence of similar households on local house prices.
4 The population of Amsterdam decreased between 1960 and 1985. See
https://www.ois.amsterdam.nl/visualisatie/bevolking.html.
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massive investment in the quality of housing and public space, in-
cluding the restoration of many old buildings.5 The return to the city of
higher income groups was facilitated by the growing stock of owner-
occupied housing. In the course of the 1990 s the Dutch economy was
thriving and this was especially true for the cities. Amsterdam became
the focal point of economic activity. This lead to strong local demand
for housing and increasing prices. In this section we document some of
the developments focusing on the Amsterdam housing market using the
data that will later also be employed in the regression analyses. We will
therefor first provide some information about these data.
2.2. The data
We use two main databases. The first contains information about
housing transactions collected by the Dutch Association of Real Estate
Agents (NVM, 2016) that covers the period 1995–2015. During this
period, NVM registered 141,026 transactions within the municipality of
Amsterdam. After the necessary data preparation steps (i.e. removing
observations with missing or inaccurate price information, missing
house type indications et cetera) 72,178 observations are left for ana-
lysis.6 One of the main merits of the NVM data is the rich set of housing
characteristics. Table A1 in the appendix shows the descriptive statistics
of all variables.
We combine this information with a second database obtained from
the municipality of Amsterdam (OIS, 2017) on the total number of
houses and the shares of owner-occupied, private rental and social
rental housing for the years 1995–2015. This data is available on a sub-
neighbourhood-level (in Dutch ‘Buurten’), which we refer to as wards.
There are 476 wards7 but in our analyses we only use the 203 that have
non-negligible shares of both owner-occupied and rental housing. The
size of these wards is much smaller than that of the 4-position postal
code areas that are often used in analyses of the Amsterdam housing
market.8 A special feature of the wards is that they tend to be smaller in
the denser parts of the municipality. These include parts of the city
dating back to the 19th century and earlier where gentrification is
potentially an important issue.
2.3. House prices
Fig. 2 documents the development of house prices in the period
1997–2015 by presenting hedonic price indexes for the seven main
areas in the Amsterdam municipality shown on the map of Fig. 1.
Nominal house prices have increased substantially in the time window
we study throughout the city, but there appears to be a dichotomy. On
the one had there is the old city centre and the areas West, South and
East that surround it south of the river IJ where prices increased by a
factor 2.5 or more. On the other hand there are the remoter suburbs
New-West and Southeast, where price increases were more moderate.
The area north of the IJ is also lagging behind the first group, but less so
than New-West and Southeast.
Guerrieri et al. (2013) have argued that gentrification in U.S. cities
extends existing high income areas following a positive economic
shock. Since house prices in the existing areas were already high, this
means that price increases are especially large in surrounding areas
where house prices were initially at a lower level. Fig. 3 shows the
initial price on the horizontal axis and the price increase on the vertical
one. The dichotomy between the four core areas and the three remoter
ones is clearly recognizable. And although the negative correlation
between price increase and initial price is not observed for all the seven
areas in the municipality of Amsterdam, within the subset of core areas
price increases were lower in the Center and South, where incomes and
house price were already high, than in the areas gentrifying over the
study period, the West and East. This suggests that something like
American style gentrification was going on in the central part of the
Amsterdam municipality.
The dichotomy between the central part of the Amsterdam
Fig. 1. The municipality of Amsterdam and the seven main areas (‘stadsdelen’). Source: based on https://maps.amsterdam.nl/gebiedsindeling/?LANG=nl.
5 See Koster & Rouwendal (2017).
6 This number refers to transactions in the period 1997-2015. We didn't use
the transaction in the years 1995 and 1996 in order to be able to use the lagged
shares of rental housing that were available to us from 1995. Note also that
observations in wards with (almost) only owner-occupied or rental houses were
dropped.
7 See Figure 4. 8 See, for instance, Rouwendal & Van Duijn, (2017).
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municipality and the remoter parts North, New-West and Southeast is
known by all inhabitants who indicate the former as the area ‘within
the ringroad’ – the A10 that roughly coincides with the border of this
area below the IJ lake – widely regarded as too expensive for ordinary
people. Fig. 3 confirms this folk wisdom and suggests that gentrification
may differ in importance in both parts of the city.
2.4. Rent control and the stock of rental housing
During WWII rents in the Netherlands were frozen and rent control
has been kept in place ever since. The rent control does not only refer to
the properties of the housing associations – to which we refer as social
housing - but also most the stock of rental housing owned by private
parties, the exception being a small high quality segment. We will refer
to the rent controlled private properties as private rental housing.
In the first half of the 20th century it was quite common for weal-
thier people in the Netherlands to own one or a few houses that were
rented out. After the introduction of rent control the value of such
rental housing as an asset plummeted. Renters had a strongly protected
position and could not be forced to leave, which implied that transfer to
the owner-occupied sector was difficult and occurred only gradually.
Even today a sizable part of the Amsterdam housing stock is private
rental. Since no construction of such housing occurred after 1945, it
mainly consists of older housing. In contrast, the stock of social rental
housing increased considerably in the postwar decades including in
older parts of the city through brownfield development, demolition of
private rental housing – often in bad condition - followed by new
construction of social rental housing, and renovation.
As mentioned in the introduction, generic subsidies on the con-
struction of social housing were abandoned in the early 1990 s. This
was not intended to stop the construction of social housing altogether.
The housing associations had been able to accumulate a non-negligible
amount of equity in earlier decades.9 Moreover, the value of social
housing that remained after its supposed maximum lifespan of 50 years
was usually considerable, especially in the big cities where land prices
are high. Although – unsurprisingly – the construction of social housing
decreased substantially after the subsidies were abolished, housing as-
sociations remained active in the construction of such housing in Am-
sterdam, often aided by the local government through low land prices.
In the course of the 1990 s it was realized that allowing housing
associations to sell part of their stock could help to satisfy the rising
demand for owner-occupied housing. Moreover, this would provide an
additional opportunity for the associations to free part of their wealth –
that was mainly incorporated in the housing they owned - and invest it
in newer social housing which could help them to better serve the needs
Fig. 2. Development of hedonic house price index by ‘stadsdeel’. Source: own computations based on NVM data .
Fig. 3. Price increase by ‘stadsdeel’ versus initial price. Source: own computations based on NVM data.
9 Subsidies on construction were computed to be equal to the gap between
costs and discounted revenues based on the calculation of a ‘dynamic cost’ and
paid in the course of their exploitation of the houses, which gave the govern-
ment the opportunity to adjust the necessary (for breaking even) subsidy when
exploitation conditions changed over time. Contrary to what the computations
assumed, even if the house could no longer be used, the value of the land un-
derneath it could be considerable in cities like Amsterdam.
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of their target groups.10 These ideas were incorporated in a new law on
the stimulation of homeownership11 and a government white paper
entitled ‘What people wish, where people live’ (in Dutch: ‘Mensen,
Wensen, Wonen’).12 The target was to sell 25,000 social houses per year
in the whole country.13 The sale could take place against conditions
that were attractive to the seller: a sales price of 90% of the estimated
market price was regarded as feasible, but 80% of that price when
selling to new occupiers and even 70% when selling to residents was
considered as allowed.14
Already in 1998, in anticipation of these developments, the muni-
cipality of Amsterdam made a covenant with the local housing asso-
ciations that to sell some 28,575 houses by 2010. This would increase
the share of owner-occupied housing to 35%. A second covenant was
reached in 2008, referring to the sale of an additional 12,000 houses by
2016. Although these figures were not completely realized, the cove-
nants contributed substantially to the change in the homeownership
rate that has occurred since the early 1990 s. New construction in ex-
isting urban areas (mainly in-fills), predominantly owner-occupied, was
the second driving force.
The maps in Fig. 4 show that there was an increase in the share of
owned houses between 1995 and 2015 all over Amsterdam. This con-
clusion is confirmed by Fig. 5 that shows the development of the shares
of the three tenure types in our data set (the 203 wards spread over the
Amsterdam municipality) in the period considered. In the period
1995–2015 the share of social rental housing decreased from 45% to
38%, while the share of private rental housing decreased from 40% to
32%. While in the beginning of the period we study homeownership
was mainly concentrated in some older parts of the city – e.g. the canal
houses which have always been private property – and was mainly
luxury housing, at its end homeownership was common and referred to
all kinds of housing in many parts of the city. A major change in the
Amsterdam housing market had taken place.
2.5. Housing construction
As noted, the increase in the share of owner-occupied housing is not
only the result of the sale of existing rental housing, but also of con-
struction and demolition. Over the 20 year period 1994–2014 >
40,000 houses, or approximately 10% were added to the existing
stock.15 The additions were not solely owner-occupied housing. As a
rule the municipal government still requires at least 30% social rental
housing in new construction projects, which is lower than the share in
the existing stock. Much of the construction was concentrated in re-
development areas like the Java-Island, close to the central station, and
IJburg a newly developed area consisting of newly created islands in
the IJ-lake to the east of the city center. However, in all parts of the city
(‘Stadsdelen’) the housing stock increased every year.
Our data do not directly inform us about demolitions and new
construction, but we know the total housing stock in each year of the
period we study. Fig. 6 maps the difference between the number of
houses per ward in 2015 and 1995 as a percentage of the 2015 stock.
The figure confirms that construction of new housing occurred every-
where in the city. It may be noted that the change in the stock provides
an underestimate of new construction, because new houses may replace
demolished older housing.
2.6. Housing associations and the sale of social housing
Since the early 1990 s the position of the housing associations has
been vulnerable. They own a large part of the housing stock and are
expected to use their wealth in the public interest, but they are outside
the public sector. Politicians do not have direct control over them, but
they determine the increase in the regulated rents of social housing
each year and expect the social housing associations to do their bidding.
However, policy makers themselves have not always been clear and
consistent in formulating what that is. Depending on the political colour
and circumstances, entrepreneurship and social service have been em-
phasized. The lack of subsidies made it at least clear that financial
control and professionalization were important issues. This has prob-
ably contributed to a large number of mergers which increased the size
of the average housing association in the Netherlands considerably,
although there is no evidence that the larger scale has contributed to
efficiency (van den Berge, Buitelaar, and Weterings, 2013; Veenstra
et al., 2017). The presence of a large amount of wealth in many of the
associations, in combination with the absence of clear targets and
proper checks and balances16 left the possibility of associations be-
coming engaged in risky, and in some cases deviant, behaviour.
Currently 8 housing associations are active in Amsterdam. Of these,
two small ones are specialized in student housing and housing with
care.17 The other six own at least 20,000 houses each, and the largest of
these, twice that number. In total the housing associations own almost
193,000 houses, or 45% of the total Amsterdam housing stock in
2013.18
Fig. 7 shows the development of the sale of social rental housing
over time. The figure reveals a substantial amount of temporal varia-
tion, partly in response to the recession of 2007 and the years that
followed. Although not shown in the Figure, there is also a lot of var-
iation in the sales by housing association over time. Over the whole
period considered almost 12% of the total stock of social rental housing
was sold to private persons, with sales distributed over all the areas of
Amsterdam.
Earlier in this paper we emphasized that any positive impact of the
changing share of owner-occupied housing on the local (neighbour-
hood) housing price is probably related to changing demographic
composition. It is therefore important to notice that social rental
housing could be sold to current tenants at a discount. Selling to current
tenants happened in approximately 10% of the cases, in most cases
without a discount.19 According to Breure (2009) 30% of the social
rental houses sold by housing associations were bought by persons al-
ready living in its neighbourhood.20 Breure (2009) reports that 10% of
the social rental houses sold in 2004 were sold again before 2008, often
at considerably higher prices. This does not seem to be a surprisingly
high number and house prices were rapidly increasing throughout
Amsterdam in that period.21
10 At the time house prices were rapidly increasing and this suggested that
housing associations could use their wealth as a ‘revolving fund’ were the ca-
pital gains associated with the sale of older housing provided the means to
construct new houses.
11 The law Bevordering Eigen WoningBezit (WEB) passed the government in
2000. See http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0011919/2017-01-01.
12 Ministry of Housing (2001). One of the first chapters is entitled: ‘From
housing to living.’
13 Realizations were much lower: 14,000-16,000 house were sold annually.
14 See Aalbers (2004) for further discussion.
15 OIS (2017).
16 The wealth of housing associations originates from rental revenues of their
own housing stock. The housing associations have no shareholders or other
owners of their capital. There is no independent public authority overseeing
these organizations.
17We have no information about the sales of one of these associations.
18 Note that this differs from Figure 5. The reason is that the Figure refers to
the 203 wards we use in the analysis below, not to the total housing stock.
19 Information provided by AFWC.
20 Breure (2009) also reports that in particular areas, Tuindorp-Oostzaan and
Amsterdam-Noord, the majority of the houses sold by the associations was
bought by current occupiers. She also reports that in these areas incomes,
educations levels and the number of children have increased, possibly because
the sale of houses induced households that would otherwise have moved to
other areas to stay.
21 Note also that house prices were still increasing in this period.
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Fig. 4. Maps of the share of owned houses for 1995 (left) and 2015 (right) in the Amsterdam neighbourhoods included in our analysis (i.e. the unshaded neigh-
bourhoods are not included in our data).
Fig. 5. Changes in the shares of tenure types 1995–2015.
Fig. 6. Share of housing constructed since 1995 in the 2015 stock.
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2.7. Allocation of rental housing
Housing associations were founded to take care of the housing needs
of the poor. This remained their target group in the postwar years when
their housing stock expanded considerably.22 With a total share of more
than 30% in the Amsterdam housing stock and an initially even larger
share of cheap private rental housing, it was of course impossible that
only the poorest people lived in rent-controlled housing. The stock of
regulated rental housing in Amsterdam even today is large enough to
house all households belonging to the share of low income households
according to any reasonable definition. Indeed, one of the reasons for
stimulating the sale of social rental housing was the observation that
many households occupying this type of housing had a medium or high
income, while at the same time there were many low-income house-
holds on the waiting lists.
The underlying issue is that household income can be checked at the
time tenants move in, but that they cannot be forced to move out
afterwards if the growth in their incomes pushes them out of the target
group for social rental housing. In fact, until the 1980 s there even was
no enforced policy of restricting entry to social housing to low-income
households. Such households were prioritized, but social-democrats
often thought that in principle anyone could be in social housing.
However, since the early 1990 s more efforts were made to ensure that
only lower income households entered vacant social housing, the main
argument being that the subsidies involved were meant to help this
group. The stricter enforcement of allocation rules was further stimu-
lated by pressure from the European Union23 and the desire to limit tax
expenditure on housing allowances.24 Currently 80% of the social
rental housing that becomes vacant must be allocated to households in
the target group, households with an income below € 36,13525 while an
additional 10% must be allocated to households with an annual income
at most equal to € 40,349. .26.
Once they have gained access to social housing, households can stay
as long as they want. The low controlled rent makes moving towards
owner-occupied housing less attractive, even if a substantial increase in
quality can be realized. The limited availability of owner-occupied
housing in Amsterdam reinforced this effect. The result is low mobility
from social rental to owner-occupied housing and a large share of social
housing that is occupied by households no longer belonging to the
target group. In this situation, the sale of social rental housing must be
expected to help increasing the supply of owner-occupied housing,
while it liquidates wealth of the housing associations that can be used to
make available other social housing for low-income households on the
waiting lists.
It is less clear how the allocation in the private rental sector works.
Landlords try to select households with stable incomes who can be
expected to pay the rents and keep the house in good shape. This makes
it less likely that people with unstable employment or family situations
are in this part of the market. On the other hand, the old age, in general
low quality and poor incentives for maintenance make it unlikely that
this part of the housing stock is very attractive for medium or high
income households except for its low rent. Note, however, that the
latter is a significant issue in the Amsterdam housing market where
house prices are very high by Dutch standards.
2.8. Literature
The first study on the sale of social rental housing on house prices in
the Netherlands was carried out by Van de Minne, Francke, and
Conijn (2012) who focused on the impact of the possibility to sell social
rental housing below the market price on the development of the price
index for owner-occupied housing in the Netherlands. Two years later
Schilder et al. (2014) looked at the impact of the sale of social rental
housing on the transaction prices of nearby houses. They estimated an
average decrease of 2% of the transaction prices over the period
2005–2013 for the Netherlands as a whole. When focusing on Am-
sterdam, they found that the local price discount was limited: social
housing was sold on average only 5.7% below the estimated market
value. Nevertheless, they found a statistically significant effect
of− 1.6% of the sale of social housing on transaction prices in this city.
The study did not control for the simultaneous sale of private rental
housing.
Gentrification in Amsterdam has recently been studied by
Fig. 7. Sale of social rental housing in Amsterdam 1998–2016. Note: the number indicated for 2002 refers in fact to the total number of houses sold in the period
1998–2002.
22 In 2017 the target group for social rental housing were households with an
annual income of at most ϵ 36,136.
23 The argument is that housing association are subsidized by the govern-
ment, which distorts the market on which they are active. EU rules only allow
this if the subsidies are targeted at a clearly defined group.
24 Low income households can apply for a housing allowance if the rent they
pay exceeds a normative share of their income. The subsidy covers part of the
difference between the actual and normative rent. Without strict allocation
rules it stimulates housing consumption and allows housing associations to
assign relatively expensive houses to low income households. About 25% of the
inhabitants of rent-controlled housing receive such an allowance.
25 This is almost equal to the median income of Dutch households (see S.
Groot, Mohlmann, & Lejour, 2016). 26 These figures refer to 2017.
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Hochstenbach et al. (2015) who found relatively small effects. More
specifically, they report that a comparison of the income levels of in-
coming and leaving households does not provide evidence of direct
economic displacement. Although they note that the incoming house-
holds were often upwardly mobile, Boterman and van Gent (2014) fo-
cused on tenure conversion and concluded that it caused social up-
grading (the status of the in-migrants being higher than that of the older
inhabitants) and facilitated demographic and ethnic transformations of
neighborhoods. However, they found that the effects differed sub-
stantially over neighborhoods and ethnic groups. For example, Turkish
migrants often bought the formerly rental housing, whereas Surinamese
people appeared not to be interested in homeownership. The authors
could not distinguish between social and private rental housing.
3. Data
The data have already been introduced in the previous section. For
the regression results that are presented in the next section, the NVM
data are the basic source. For every transaction NVM members report
the transaction price and a large number of characteristics including
floor area, apartment type, number of rooms, parking facilities.27
The number of observations fluctuates over time. In 1997 > 2000
transactions were registered, but in 1999 barely 1200. After that the
number increased continuously to more than 5,500 in 2007. The next
trough was reached in 2013 with a little less than 4200 transactions
registered, while in the last two years for which we have observations
more than 6000 transactions were observed. In each year some 80% of
the transactions refer to houses in the central part of the municipality
with West and South each good for a quarter of the total number of
transactions and the remaining 30% shared more or less equally be-
tween Center and East. Of the three peripheral areas, New-West is the
most important one as far as housing sales are concerned with some
10% of the total number of transactions but its relative position fell
somewhat over time. The share of transactions referring to North in-
creased slightly over time while that of Southeast decreased.
Fig. 4 above showed the development of the tenure shares in the
wards we consider. There is a wide variation in the shares of the various
tenure types per ward. The standard deviation of the share of owner-
occupied housing is 16.7 in 1995 and decreases gradually to 13.6 in
2015. The maximum is stable at 80%, while the minimum is 0 until
2005, and then increases to 7%. The variance in the share of social
housing equals 30.0 in 1995 and decreases to 22.5 in 2015. Until 1999
this his share was as high as 100% and as low as 2.6%. Private rental
housing shows a similar picture with a variance decreasing from 27.0 to
17.8 and before 1998 values that ranging between 0 and 100. In 2015
the highest share of social housing is still 90%, and that of private rental
housing 74%.
To put the analysis that follows into perspective, it is useful to
provide some information about the inhabitants of houses in the 1990 s,
before the sale of rental housing started. We use information from the
national housing survey (in Dutch: Woningbehoefteonderzoek) from
1993. The survey covered some1900 Amsterdam households. Of these,
236 were in owner-occupied housing, 931 in social rental housing and
488 in private rental housing. The others rented a house from the
municipality or government institutions or were subtenants.
Almost 50% of the inhabitants of private rental housing were sin-
gles. Pairs without children at home were the dominant category
among owner-occupiers (44%). Social rental housing was halfway be-
tween both. Annual household income is twice as large among owner-
occupiers as among renters. Those in private rental housing had on
average a 10% higher income than those in social housing.
There was a substantial difference in the country of origin of the
various tenure types: 89% of the owner-occupiers and 84% of the pri-
vate renters were born in the Netherlands, but only 68% of the social
renters. Especially Moroccans and those born in the former Caribbean
Dutch colonies were overrepresented in social housing.
Of the rental houses – of either subtype – 90% were apartments, but
apartments were only 55% of the owner-occupied houses. The private
rental stock was the oldest with75% dating to before WWII compared to
50% of the owner-occupied stock and only 30% of the social rental
housing stock. Owner-occupied housing had on average 4 rooms, pri-
vate rental housing 3, and social rental housing 3.22. Finally, 82% of
owner-occupied housing had central heating, while for social and pri-
vate rental housing this figure was respectively 65% and 43%.
Summarizing, it appears that the special position of social rental
housing is reflected in the ethnic composition of its inhabitants that
differs substantially from the other tenure types. The older age of pri-
vate rental housing and the lack of incentives for modernization asso-
ciated with the rent control imposed since WWII probably makes it less
attractive. Gentrification through changes in the demographic compo-
sition of neighbourhoods or upgrading of dilapidated housing appear to
be potentially relevant possibilities, but it seems difficult to make any
specific prediction based on the information just presented.
4. Method and results
4.1. The specification
To investigate the impact of the changing shares of rental housing
per ward, we estimate a hedonic price equation. Our first specification
relates the natural logarithm of the transaction price of a house to its
structural characteristics, an area fixed effect, a year fixed effect and the
change in the share of rental housing in the previous year. The area
fixed effects refer to the wards, the smallest geographical unit about
which we have information. The year fixed effects are specific for each
area (Stadsdeel, see Fig. 1) in order to take into account the local dif-
ferences in house price development that were documented in the
previous section (see Fig. 2). Mathematically, the basic model is for-
mulated as follows:
= + + + +Log Price α βX δ γ RENT( ) * Δ ɛi w i i t i s i w i t i i( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ( ) (1)
The equation states that the price of house i that is located in ward w
(i) and area s(i) and sold in year t(i) equals the sum of a ward-specific
intercept αw(i), the impact of the structural characteristics βXi and the
general time trend δt(i)*s(i). The variable of interest is the change in the
share of rental housing ΔRENTw(i), t in the ward in which the house is
located and the year in which the house is sold. Finally there is an error
term ɛi. The equation thus relates the level of the transaction price to the
change in the share of rental housing. The idea is that an increase in the
local supply of owner-occupied housing due to the sale of rental
housing causes a temporary change in the price of owner-occupied
housing. The familiar forces of supply and demand would suggest a
positive coefficient γ1, but gentrification effects could reverse this me-
chanism. Note that the ward-specific fixed effects ensure that the
coefficient γ1is determined only by variation in the changes in the share
of rental housing over time within the wards.
One may think that not all effects of the sale of rental housing are
realized immediately. For that reason we have also estimated equations
in which the change in the share of rental housing is lagged. If the sale
of rental housing has a gentrifying impact, it may even be possible that
the sale of rental housing has a long-lasting impact on house prices in
the ward. One may attempt to measure this effect by including (the
level of) the share of rental housing into the equation:
= + + + +Log Price α βX δ φRENT( ) * ɛi w i i t i s i w i t i i( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ( ) (2)
This equation states that a change in the share of rental housing has
a permanent impact on the level of house prices in the ward. Although
this is somewhat extreme when taken literally, it may be noted that our
27 A full list of characteristics used in the regressions with descriptive sta-
tistics is available upon request.
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data cover a period of only 20 years and gentrification was an issue
throughout that period.
It may of course also be argued that short- and long run effects may
differ and that it could be useful to distinguish the two by including the
recent change as well as a the lagged level of the share of rental
housing. For instance, it may be argued that in the short run the forces
of supply and demand may dominate, whereas in the longer run the
gentrification effect is more important. The simplest of such a specifi-
cation would be:
= + + +
+ +−
Log Price α βX δ γ RENT
φRENT
( ) * Δ
ɛ
i w i i t i s i w i t i
w i t i i
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ( )
( ), ( ) 1 (3)
In this equation the short run is identified with a single period,
while the long run effect is present from the second year onwards.
4.2. Basic results
Table 1 presents estimation results for the basic specification. The
first thing to observe is that all estimated coefficients are negative, in-
dicating that the sale of rental housing tends to increase prices. Gen-
trification effects thus seem to dominate those of increased supply of
owner-occupied housing. Column 1 shows that a decrease in the share
of rental housing has an immediate positive impact on the price of
owner-occupied housing in the ward. The effect is significant at less
than 1%. In column 2 we use the one year lagged change in the share of
rental housing. The coefficient is again negative and significant, but
smaller. In column 3 we use the changes in the share of rental housing
in the current and previous year and find two negative coefficients that
are both insignificant. In column 4 we use the level of the share of
rental housing in the current period as explanatory variable. As ex-
plained above, the estimated coefficient indicates a permanent effect
associated with the sale of rental housing. The coefficient is again ne-
gative and larger in absolute value than the ones estimated earlier.
Finally, in column 5 we use the change in the share of rental housing in
the current year as well as the one-year lagged level of this share to be
able to distinguish short and long-run effects. For both variables we find
a significant negative coefficient, suggesting that gentrification effects
are present in the short run as well as in the long run. We have also
experimented with more lags, but such specifications did not change
the picture that emerges from Table 1. Summarizing, it may be con-
cluded that the basic results of Table 3 suggests that the sale of rental
housing made the wards concerned more attractive for owner occu-
piers, both in the short run and in the long run.
4.3. Distinguishing between social and private rental housing
We noted above that the distinction between social and private
rental housing is probably relevant for gentrification. While both are
rent controlled, housing associations have a social function and – at
least in principle – the obligation to be available for all low-income
households. For private rental housing this is less clear and therefore
one may expect that gentrification effects are especially present when
the share of social housing decreases.
Table 2 reports the results of regressions in which the two types of
rental housing have been distinguished. The first column confirms our
conjecture that the gentrifying effects of the sale of social rental housing
exceed those of private rental housing and also more significant. If we
look at the one-year lagged effects, we find that only the coefficient for
social rental housing is significant, but smaller than in the first
Table 1
Regression results for changes in the share of rental housing by ward.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ΔRENTw, t (%) −0.00135*** (0.00040) −0.00082
(0.00063)
−0.00258*** (0.00065)
−RENTΔ w t, 1 (%) −0.000947** (0.00047) −0.00054
(0.00068)
RENTw, t −0.00193*** (0.00061)
−RENTw t, 1 −0.00185** (0.00062)
Structural characteristics, ward dummies and
year*stadsdeel dummies
YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 72,178 72,178 72,178 72,178 72,178
R-squared 0.9202 0.9202 0.9202 0.9203 0.9203
Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level are reported.
Table 2
Regression results for changes in the share of social and private rental housing by ward.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)






ΔPRIV RENTw, t (%) −0.00088** (0.00044) −0.00107* (0.00057) −0.00255*** 0.00063
−SOC RENTΔ w t, 1 −0.00115**
(0.00050)
−0.00061 (0.00063)
−PRIV RENTΔ w t t, 1 −0.00018 (0.00041) 0.00035 (0.00054)
SOC RENTw, t to t −0.00074*** (0.00047)
PRIV RENTw, t to t −0.000251***
(0.00067)
−SOC RENTw t to t, 1 −0.00055 (0.00047)
−PRIV RENTw t to t, 1 −0.00255***
(0.00069)
Structural characteristics, ward dummies and
year*stadsdeel dummies
YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 72,178 72,178 72,178 72,178 72,178
R-squared 0.9202 0.9202 0.9202 0.9205 0.9205
Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level are reported.
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regression. If both the current and lagged changes in the share of rental
housing are included, we find that only the current change is weakly
significant. If we turn to the regressions in levels, the picture changes in
that the share of private rental housing now has a much larger (more
than three times) coefficient than the share of social housing. Both are
strongly significant. Column (5) suggests that the sale of social rental
housing only has a temporary effect, whereas that of private rental
housing has a permanent effect that is fully realized immediately.
4.4. Centre and periphery
In Section 2 it was suggested that the distinction between the central
area where house prices were initially highest or increased most and the
remoter parts could be important. We will now consider if there are
differences in the impact of the sale of rental housing between these two
parts of the city.
The results reported in Table 3 confirm the presence of these dif-
ferences. If we only allow for effects in the current year, the change in
the share of social housing has a positive effect on house prices which is
twice as large in the centre than in the periphery. There is no effect of
changes in the share of private rental housing. If we only allow for one-
year lagged effects, there is only an effect of social housing in the
centre. If effects of the change in the current as well as the previous year
are allowed for, we find comparable effects of changes in the share of
social rental housing in the centre and the periphery, but only in the
current period. For private rental housing we do not find any effect in
the centre, while in the periphery there is a positive effect of the sale of
private housing in the current period and a negative one of the same
order of magnitude in the next one.
Again the picture changes substantially if we allow for permanent
effects. In column (4) we find significant gentrifying effects of the sale
of social as well as private housing, but the impact of the latter is much
larger. Column (5) suggests that the sale of social housing only has a
temporary effect that is larger in the core than in the periphery. The sale
of private rental housing has a permanent impact that is realized im-
mediately in the core, but no significant effect in the periphery.
4.5. Controlling for changes in the total stock
A concern one may still have with the results presented in the
previous subsections is that changes in the stock of housing may partly
explain it. We have seen that new construction in the period we con-
sidered was predominantly owner-occupied. It therefore tends to drive
down the share of rental housing, and especially that of private rental
housing. New housing is, moreover, of better quality and could attract
other households to the ward that could be responsible for a gentrifi-
cation effect.
To deal with this issue, we have added the gross change in the stock
– expressed as a percentage of the initial stock – as an additional control
variable. Since we have no direct information on new construction and
demolitions, this is the best we can do. Table 4 presents the results.
Increases in the stock do not appear to have any effect on house prices
in the central part of the municipality and have a positive and relatively
large impact on house prices in the peripheral part. Most of the results
reached earlier do not change by inclusion of the new control variable.
The only exception is that the sale of social housing in the peripheral
part now appears to have a permanent negative effect on house prices.
4.6. Endogeneity
A concern one might have with the regressions reported thus far is
that landlords do not choose the houses they sell randomly. Selling
rental housing may be easier in city quarters that are already gentri-
fying. If more houses are selected for sale in these areas, and the gen-
trification causes prices to increase there more than expected, the result
will be a correlation between the error term in our estimating equation
and the change in the share of rental housing. The result is endogeneity
of that variable. Although our inclusion of separate year fixed effects for
seven areas (Stadsdelen) may help to mitigate this problem, we cannot
Table 3
Distinction between center and periphery.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CENTRAL AREA
ΔSOC RENTw, t (%) −0.00251***
(0.00090)
−0.00134* (0.00106) −0.00339*** (0.00105)
ΔPRIV RENTw, t (%) 0.00112 (0.00068) −0.00076 (0.00083) −0.00352*** 0.00079
−SOC RENTΔ w t, 1 −0.00184**
(0.00092)
−0.00119 (0.00120)
−PRIV RENTΔ w t t, 1 −0.00068 (0.00063) −0.00030 (0.00054)
SOC RENTw, t to t −0.00134* (0.00071)
PRIV RENTw, t to t −0.00359***
(0.00077)
−SOC RENTw t to t, 1 −0.00115 (0.00073)
−PRIV RENTw t to t, 1 −0.00363*** (0.00078)
PERIPHERAL AREA
ΔSOC RENTw, t (%) −0.00102** (0.00048) −0.00111**
(0.00054)
−0.00137** (0.00056)
ΔPRIV RENTw, t (%) −0.00061 (0.00045) −0.00160**
(0.00073)
−0.00050 0.00050
−SOC RENTΔ w t, 1 −0.00047 (0.00042) −0.00017 (0.00054)
−PRIV RENTΔ w t t, 1 −0.00052 (0.00029) 0.00129** (0.00050)
SOC RENTw, t to t 0.00067 (0.00047)
PRIV RENTw, t to t 0.00016 (0.00056)
−SOC RENTw t to t, 1 −0.00085 (0.00049)
−PRIV RENTw t to t, 1 −0.00020 (0.00060)
Structural characteristics, ward dummies and
year*stadsdeel dummies
YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 72,178 72,178 72,178 72,178 72,178
R-squared 0.9202 0.9202 0.9202 0.9206 0.9206
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be sure that it is completely absent.
To address this issue, we have constructed instruments for the
changes in the share of social and rental housing. We used informa-
tion28 about the number of houses owned by the various housing as-
sociations in small sets of contiguous wards (called buurtcombinaties in
Dutch) and the annual total sales of social rental housing by these as-
sociations to construct an instrument a la Bartik (1991). That is, we
compute the expected change in the share of social rental housing on
the basis of the total sales of housing associations per year and the
number of houses owned by each of these associations in the neigh-
bourhood. Formally, if Sk, b(t) is the housing stock owned by housing
association k in area b, and DSk(t) is the number of houses sold by as-
sociation k in year t, then the expected number of houses sold in area b
is = ∑ ′ ′EDS S t S t( ( )/ ( ))k b k b b k b, , , . The expected total number of social
rental houses sold in the area in year t equals ∑ EDSk k b, the sum of the
expected sales per association over all associations. The instrument is
this number divided over the total stock of housing in the area. The
instrument thus has the same value for all wards belonging to the same
buurtcombinatie. In Table 5 below we refer to this instrument as the
Bartik instrument.
Table 4
Adding the change in housing stock as a control variable.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CENTRAL PART
ΔSOC RENTw, t (%) −0.00254***
(0.00091)
−0.00137 (0.00107) −0.00336*** (0.00106)
ΔPRIV RENTw, t (%) 0.
(0.00068)
−0.00076 (0.00083) −0.00352*** 0.00078
−SOC RENTΔ w t, 1 −0.00184**
(0.00092)
−0.00118 (0.00121)
−PRIV RENTΔ w t t, 1 −0.00068 (0.00063) −0.00030 (0.00082)
SOC RENTw, t to t −0.00134* (0.00071)
PRIV RENTw, t to t −0.00359***
(0.00076)
−SOC RENTw t to t, 1 −0.00115 (0.00073)
−PRIV RENTw t to t, 1 −0.00363*** (0.00078)
DSTOCKW, T −0.00478 (0.00491) −0.00385 (0.00502) −0.00424 (0.00492) −0.00362 (0.00355) −0.00512 (0.00367)
PERIPHERAL PART





ΔPRIV RENTw, t (%) −0.00073* (0.00043) −0.00164**
(0.00071)
−0.00061 0.00049
−SOC RENTΔ w t, 1 −0.00061 (0.00041) −0.00007 (0.00053)
−PRIV RENTΔ w t t, 1 −0.00052 (0.00029) 0.00121** (0.00051)
SOC RENTw, t to t 0.00074 (0.00047)
PRIV RENTw, t to t 0.00018 (0.00056)
−SOC RENTw t to t, 1 0.00097** (0.00047)
−PRIV RENTw t to t, 1 −0.00024 (0.00060)
DSTOCKw, t 0.0471*** (0.0159) 0.0459*** (0.0166) 0.0464*** (0.0175) 0.0457*** (0.0120) 0.0524*** (0.0146)
Structural characteristics, ward dummies and
year*stadsdeel dummies
YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 72,178 72,178 72,178 72,178 72,178
R-squared 0.9202 0.9202 0.9202 0.9206 0.9207
Table 5
Instrumental variable (2SLS) regression results for changes in the share of rental housing by ward.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Central Central Central Central Periph. Periph.












0.00037 (0.00344) 0.043 (0.36) −0.0178
(0.0128)






















−0.0751 (0.89) 0.0595 (0.048)
Structural characteristics, ward dummies
and year*stadsdeel dummies
YES YES YES YES YES YES
Instrument Bartik+prop prop+ prop Bartik+ prop prop+ prop Bartik+ prop prop+ prop
Levels instrumented No no yes yes no No
Observations 57,947 57,947 57,947 57,947 14,231 14,231
R2 0.917 0.917 0.917 0.917 0.810 0.905
Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level are reported. First stage regressions are reported in the Appendix Table.
28 Kindly provided by the Amsterdamse Federatie van Woningcorporaties
(AFWC).
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Computation of this instrument is only possible for social rental
housing. For private rental housing we cannot make a subdivision on
the basis of ownership. However, what we can do is compute the ex-
pected number of private rental houses that would have been sold in
each ward if the observed total number of private rental houses sold in
a given year would have been determined by giving each privately
rented house the same probability of being sold. This appears to be the
best we can do for this type of housing. Formally, if DPk(t) is the total
number of private rental houses sold in the municipality in year t, the
expected number of private rental houses sold in ward w equals
= ∑EDP t P t P t DP t( ) ( ( )/ ( )) ( )w w w w k , where Pw(t) is the stock of private
rental housing in ward w in year t. The instrument is this umber, di-
vided by the total stock of housing in the ward.
In Table 5 below we report IV estimates for specification (3), the
preferred specification of our earlier exercises. We carried out separate
regressions for the central and peripheral parts of the municipality and
included the change in the housing stock as a control variable. Columns
(1) and (2) refer to the central part and use the Bartik instrument and
the proportional instrument, respectively, for the change in the share of
social rental housing. In both cases we find a significant permanent
gentrifying effect of the sale of private rental housing. Moreover, if we
use the proportional instrument for the change in social housing we also
find significant short and long run gentrifying effects of the sale of
social housing and of new construction.
Columns (3) and (4) report estimates of a variant of this model in
which we have also instrumented the level of the share of social and
private housing. The reason for doing so is the possible concern that
changes in the stocks can have short run effects on house prices with a
lag of two periods. Although in earlier egressions we did not find much
evidence for this, it was nevertheless thought useful to mitigate this
concern by instrumenting the one period lagged share with the two
period lagged share. The reported estimates show that the results do not
change.
Columns (5) and (6) are similar to (1) and (2), but refer to the
peripheral part of the municipality. We do not find any significant
coefficient referring to changes or levels in the rental housing stock or
to new construction. This does not change if we instrument for the le-
vels (the results of these specification are not reported in Table 5).
5. Conclusion
In this paper we considered the impact of the sale of rental housing
on local house prices in Amsterdam in the period 1995–2015. We
documented a substantial shift in ownership rates over this period. In
contrast with earlier work that looked for price decreases associated
with the sale of social rental housing, we also considered the sale of
private rental housing which appeared to be even more important in a
quantitative sense.
The international literature suggests that the sale of rental housing
may have gentrifying effects that boost local house prices. The speci-
fications used in this study allowed us to distinguish between short-run
and long run effects of potentially opposite signs and therefore placed
us in a good position to look for both supply effects and gentrification.
Viewed from the perspective of the earlier Dutch literature, that has
repeatedly claimed to have found modest price-decreasing effects from
the sale of social rental housing, it is perhaps somewhat surprising to
conclude that we have been unable to find serious evidence of any
depressing impact of the sale of rental housing on the transaction prices
of owner-occupied housing in Amsterdam.
Inspection of the development of house prices in seven areas
(stadsdelen) of the municipality revealed a qualitative difference be-
tween a central area, including the canal belt, and a peripheral area.
Within the central area, the parts with the initially lowest price levels
experienced the strongest increase in price as was observed by
Gurrieri et al. (2013) for U.S. cities. In the peripheral area both the
house price levels and the increases are smaller than in the central area.
Our main finding is robust evidence of a modest gentrifying impact
of the sale of private rental housing in the central part of the munici-
pality. That is, an increase in the supply of owner-ccupied housing of
15% of the total stock in a period of 20 years has been absorbed by the
market without any serious indication of a depressing impact on the
price level. Although substitution of tenures implies a simultaneous
decrease in the supply of rental housing, the two should not be expected
to compensate each other because of the limited overlap between the
groups of renters and owner-occupiers. A main reason for the separa-
tion of both groups is that the maximum size of a mortgage loan de-
pends on income, which makes owner-occupation in an expensive place
like Amsterdam only possible for higher income households.
Our results suggest that the gentrifying effect has outweighed the
effect of the increased supply and both were roughly of the same order
of magnitude. Nevertheless, in the central part of the municipality we
find robust evidence of a statistically significant net gentrification effect
of the sale of private rental housing. Our IV estimation results suggest
an elasticity of the housing price with respect to the share of private
rental housing of around 0.1.
It seems probable that the positive net effect of selling private rental
housing has to do with the long period of rent control that has been
imposed on such housing and removed most of the incentives to mod-
ernize it, for instance by introducing central heating, or combining two
small older apartments into a luxury modern one. Our estimates in-
dicate quite strongly that the gentrifying effect is realized immediately
after the sale of the rental housing.
We also found some indications of a gentrifying effect of increases in
the housing stock in the peripheral areas of Amsterdam. Although the
estimated coefficients lost significance after instrumenting the changes
in both types of rental housing, it should be noted that our instruments
did not work well for this part of the municipality.
Placed in the perspective of the international literature, it can be
noted that the sale of rental housing in Amsterdam shows some simi-
larities with the end of rent control in Cambridge (Ma) studied in Autor
et al (2014). Like these authors we find a significant gentrification ef-
fect.
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Results of first stages of IV regressions
Table and column Endogenous var Instrument Estimate Standard error
Column 1 Δ % soc rental Bartik for social −1.835*** 0.395
prop for private 120.42*** 31.56
Δ % priv rental Bartik for social 0.921* 0.51
Prop for private 99.43** 45.66
Column 2 Δ % soc rental prop for social −59.06*** 18.53
prop for private 115.08*** 31.10
Δ % priv rental prop for social 119.59*** 24.61
prop for private 105.48** 45.25
Column 3 Δ % soc rental Bartik for social −1.248*** 0.325
prop for private 71.58** 31.55
−SOCIAL RENTw t, 2(%) −0.157*** 0.022
−PRIV RENTw t, 2(%) −0.0071 0.0060
Δ % priv rental Bartik for social 0.508 0.43
prop for private 161.43*** 45.19
−SOCIAL RENTw t, 2(%) −0.00033 0.020
−PRIV RENTw t, 2(%) −0.109*** 0.019
−SOCIAL RENTw t, 1(%) Bartik for social −2.652*** 0.376
prop for private 176.47*** 25.97
−SOCIAL RENTw t, 2(%) 0.798*** 0.021
−PRIV RENTw t, 2(%) 0.020** 0.0096
−PRIV RENTw t, 1(%) Bartik for social 1.569*** 0.489
prop for private −187.53*** 33.06
−SOCIAL RENTw t, 2(%) 0.0701*** 0.025
−PRIV RENTw t, 2(%) 0.844*** 0.025
Column 4 Δ % soc rental prop for social −62.11*** 20.13
prop for private 69.31** 31.33
−SOCIAL RENTw t, 2(%) −0.163*** 0.023
−PRIV RENTw t, 2(%) −0.011 0.0061
Δ % priv rental prop for social 130.87 25.99
prop for private 165.35*** 44.74
−SOCIAL RENTw t, 2(%) 0.0113 0.020
−PRIV RENTw t, 2(%) −0.104*** 0.019
−SOCIAL RENTw t, 1(%) prop for social 130.751*** 23.46
prop for private 175.57*** 26.40
−SOCIAL RENTw t, 2(%) 0.797*** 0.022
−PRIV RENTw t, 2(%) 0.0173* 0.0093
−PRIV RENTw t, 1(%) prop for social −90.70*** 29.18
prop for private −189.46*** 32.66
−SOCIAL RENTw t, 2(%) 0.0628** 0.026
−PRIV RENTw t, 2(%) 0.842*** 0.025
Column 5 Δ % soc rental Bartik for social −0.806 1.252
prop for private 435.46 268.04
Δ % priv rental Bartik for social 0.736 1.423
Prop for private −469.43 297.12
Column 6 Δ % soc rental prop for social −72.770 46.31
prop for private 451.35 267.25
Δ % priv rental prop for social 17.806 62.64
prop for private −475.87 298.28
Only the estimation results for the instrument(s) are reported. All control variables have been included in the first stage regressions. Robust standard errors clustered
at ward level are reported.
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